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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE SCOTT ROBERTSON, ] 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
UTAH FUEL COMPANY, ] 
Defendant-Respondent, 
i Case No. 940147-CA 
i Priority No. 14(b) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH'S DISCLAIMER CASES ARE CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE. 
A. Introduction 
Plaintiff Lawrence Scott Robertson was summarily fired after 
ten years of faithful, productive, and loyal service to Utah Fuel 
Company (the "Company"). He was fired as punishment for his 
admitted substance abuse problem. (See Statement of Relevant 
Facts, Brief of Appellant) This was in direct violation of the 
Company's Approved Policy on Alcohol, Drugs, and Controlled 
Substances, which promised that those who voluntarily came forward 
to request help would be offered treatment without fear of 
retribution. (See Appendix 4, to Brief of Appellant) Robertson 
was fired without first being provided with progressive discipline 
as promised in the Company's employee handbook. 
Both parties have cited the cases of Johnson v. Morton 
Thiokol. Inc. . 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991) and Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah. 
Inc. , 844 P. 2d 331 (Utah 1992) in their initial briefs. The Company 
has also referred to the recently decided cases of Kirbera v. West 
One Bank, 236 Ut.Adv.Rep. 20 (Ct. App. April 1, 1994) and Sorensen 
v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp.. 236 Ut.Adv.Rep. 36 (Ct. App. April 
11, 1994). They argue that these cases are controlling. A close 
examination of these decisions reveals that Robertson's case is 
clearly distinguishable on its facts, and the facts in this case 
compel a reversal of the summary judgment. 
B. Kirbera v. West One Bank. 
Kirberg v. West One Bank, supra, involved the termination 
of Patricia Kirberg's employment as branch manager of West One 
Bank's West Jordan branch. She was fired for failing to report 
what she had heard about the legal problems and criminal charges 
against the infamous Dr. Robert Davis, a customer with substantial 
deposits and a substantial existing loan. Kirberg argued that she 
could not be fired without cause and without progressive 
discipline. She based this on her "belief" that this was the 
company's policy. 
West One pointed out that Kirberg's signed employment 
application contained a disclaimer of contractual liability. In 
addition to this, West One's Human Resource Manual contained an 
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"at-will" disclaimer. This manual also provided that, "Depending 
on the severity of the problem, disciplinary action may result in 
progressive discipline, a negotiated voluntary separation, or 
immediate involuntary separation." [Emphasis added] 
Later, these key portions of the manual were incorporated 
into yet another separate booklet entitled "Code of Conduct." 
Kirberg received a copy of this and signed a statement 
acknowledging that she had read it. 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment, finding 
that Kirberg's observations and training that led her to the belief 
that discipline should be progressive, and that she would not be 
fired without cause, did not create a genuine fact issue sufficient 
to defeat summary judgment. Kirberg had failed to identify any 
affirmative and definite acts of West One, demonstrating West One's 
intent to modify its at-will contract with her. The court held 
that she had not raised a jury question as to whether West One 
nullified its disclaimers and affirmatively offered her employment 
other than at-will. 
Plaintiff Robertson presents a much stronger case. His case 
is based on a clear-cut company policy which is not contained 
within the handbook and thus not subject to its disclaimers. 
(Appendix 4, Brief of Appellant) The clear import of this policy, 
as confirmed by the testimony of Robertson's supervisor, William 
Shriver, as well as past company practices, is that those who 
voluntarily come forward to request treatment, before being found 
in violation of the policy, would be offered treatment, and would 
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not otherwise be sanctioned. On the other hand, violations of this 
company policy "may" result in disciplinary action. 
Unlike Kirberg, Utah Fuel's handbook is not at all equivocal 
in its directives regarding progressive discipline. It states at 
page 14: 
When these situations develop, it is very important 
that they be handled fairly. To accomplish this, we 
have implemented the following procedures: 
STEP ONE: If there is a problem with your 
workmanship, safety, attendance, relationships with 
others or similar matters, your supervisor will 
discuss the problem with you. . . . [Emphasis added] 
(Appendix 5, Brief of Appellant) 
There is nothing indefinite in the directive, "Your 
supervisor will discuss the problem with you." This action is 
mandated! West One's analogous provision stated: 
Depending on the severity of the problem, 
disciplinary action may result in progressive 
discipline, a negotiated voluntary separation, or 
immediate involuntary separation. [Emphasis added] 
Kirberg, supra, at 21. Utah Fuel has taken affirmative and 
definite acts that clearly demonstrate its attempt to modify their 
at-will contract with Robertson. Thus, Kirberg does not support 
Utah Fuel's position herein. 
C. Sorensen v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corporation. 
Sorensen v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corporationr supra. 
involves an appeal of the trial court's dismissal pursuant to Rule 
41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 41(b) allows the 
court in a bench trial to dismiss when "upon the facts and law the 
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plaintiff has shown no right to relief." On appeal, the "clearly 
erroneous" standard applies and the court must view the evidence in 
a light most favorable to the trial court's findings. Supra at 37. 
The standard of review in this matter is, of course, quite 
different. In reviewing a summary judgment, the appellate court 
must view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sanderson v. 
First Security Leasing Co.. 844 P.2d at 303 (Utah 1992). 
Sorensen relied heavily on a 1973 company booklet entitled 
"General Rules of Conduct" which was in use when he was first 
hired. Sorensen argued that this document required termination for 
cause only, and then only after a written warning, or a suspension 
subject to hearing rights. Significantly, this 1973 Code had been 
superseded by numerous revised editions, including a 1986 revision. 
(Sorensen was terminated in 1989.) Unlike the 1973 Code, 
subsequent Codes required neither a written warning nor suspension 
for rule violations. The 1986 Code simply stated, "[e]mployees who 
do not conform to this general code of conduct will be subject to 
discipline." 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that such an amorphous threat 
of discipline could not constitute a manifestation by the employer 
that was "sufficiently definite" to demonstrate an intent to form 
a relationship other than at-will. Sorensen, supra at 40. 
Utah Fuel's "Improvement and Progress Program" is mandatory. 
It requires basically a verbal warning, a written warning, and a 
suspension prior to termination. There is nothing ambiguous or 
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equivocal in its directives, "Your supervisor will meet with you 
periodically. . . . These meetings will include . . . your 
supervisor will discuss the problem with you . . . " [Emphasis 
added] 
By contrast, Kennecott's 1986 booklet no longer required a 
written warning or suspension with hearing rights. It merely 
stated that failure to conform one's conduct to the Code "will be 
subject to discipline" without ever specifically defining what that 
discipline would be. This is clearly different from Utah Fuel's 
policy. 
Utah Fuel cannot now disclaim this self-imposed mandate. 
Having announced this company policy, Utah Fuel may not now treat 
its promise as illusory. Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880 at 895 (Mich. 1980). 
Utah Fuel now argues that the handbook applied only to 
hourly workers. This argument fails scrutiny as well. The 
strongest argument against Utah Fuel is the handbook itself which 
contains no such limitation within its 98 pages. Moreover, both 
William Shriver and the plaintiff testified that the handbook 
applied to salaried and hourly workers alike. The company argues 
that references to "supervisor" in the handbook imply that it does 
not apply to salaried workers. This argument is meaningless as 
Robertson was a supervisor, but he had a supervisor, Shriver. 
Shriver had a supervisor, Zumwalt; and Zumwalt had a supervisor as 
well, Vernal Mortensen. (Zumwalt depo. at 140) 
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Judge Scott Daniels, in Sorensen. found that references in 
Kennecott's handbook to "contact a shop steward or union 
representative" were supportive of Kennecott's claim that the 
manual applied only to union employees. The word "supervisor" 
provides Utah Fuel no such corroboration. Moreover, ambiguities in 
the handbook must be interpreted against Utah Fuel. This Court 
must view the facts in a light most favorable to Robertson. This 
Court must therefore accept as fact that Utah Fuel's handbook 
applied as to Robertson. 
D. Johnson v. Morton Thiokolr Inc. 
Plaintiff, in his initial brief, recounted the essential 
facts of Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991) 
and Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 P.2d 331 (Utah 1992). An 
examination of the facts in these cases discloses that they are 
clearly distinguishable as well. 
In Johnson v. Morton Thiokolf supra, Bill Johnson relied 
entirely on the company handbook to support his argument that he 
could not be fired except for cause. He did not claim that Thiokol 
had failed to comply with its own grievance procedures. In fact, 
Thiokol had followed its grievance procedure in accordance with the 
handbook, and Johnson used this fact to support his cause argument. 
The handbook contained a detailed disclaimer, more detailed than 
the disclaimers used by Utah Fuel. The Utah Supreme Court upheld 
summary judgment on the basis of the disclaimer. Despite this 
disclaimer, the Supreme Court stated that Johnson would have been 
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entitled to challenge his termination under the handbook's 
procedures, though not the right to be fired only for cause. Id. 
at 1003. 
E. Hodgson v. Bunzl Utah. Inc. 
Hodgson v. Bunzl Utahr Inc.. supraf provides a good example 
of what a company ought to do if it truly wants to inform its 
employees that their employment is at-will. Bunzl Utah, Inc. 
informed its employees of their at-will status seven different 
ways. (See Brief of Appellant at p. 30) Hodgson was told in his 
initial interview that his employment would be at-will. The "New 
Employee Checklist" further so advised him. The company handbook 
contained five different at-will references, one of which 
specifically informed employees that they may not rely on 
progressive discipline. 
Understandably, the Utah Supreme Court had no difficulty in 
affirming summary judgment. Nevertheless, the court noted, as it 
had in Johnson v. Morton Thiokol. supra, "An employer may be bound 
to follow any discharge procedures outlined in an employee 
handbook." Id. at 3 33. 
Thus, both Johnson and Hodgson instruct us that an employer 
may be bound to follow its own discharge procedures despite its at-
will disclaimers no matter how extensive they may be. Under these 
precedents, Robertson at a minimum, was entitled to the progressive 
discipline as required in the company handbook prior to being 
demoted or fired. 
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POINT II 
ROBERTSON'S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IS NOT BARRED BY THE WORKERS 
COMPENSATION LAWS. 
Utah Fuel has argued that Robertson's cause of action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress is barred by Utah's 
workers compensation laws. This is not correct. Although 
ordinarily workers are barred from suing their employers for on-
the-job injuries, intentional injuries are the exception. Bryan v. 
Utah International. 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975). 
Plaintiff maintains that Utah Fuel fired him to punish him 
for his substance abuse problem. Prior to obtaining treatment, 
Robertson's supervisors were completely unaware of his problem. 
(Shriver depo. at 50, 61, App. 2, Brief of Appellant; Zumwalt depo. 
at 35) Neither Shriver nor Zumwalt had seen anything in 
Robertson's work performance to suggest he had a problem. Id. 
Yet, the day he returned to work following his treatment, Glen 
Zumwalt, vice president and general manager of the mine, told him 
he was being demoted four steps to "A-Pay Miner." (Zumwalt depo. 
at 66, App. 3, Brief of Appellant) Zumwalt told Robertson the 
reason for this demotion was because of his drug problem. 
(Robertson depo. at 132-133, App. 1, Brief of Appellant) Utah 
Fuel's motive was punitive and this was done with the intention of 
causing Robertson severe emotional distress. Plaintiff has indeed 
suffered severe emotional distress as a result of these events. 
(Robertson depo. at 67-68, App. 2, Brief of Appellant) 
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that a managerial employee/s 
tortious intent can be imputed to his or her own employer if the 
employee acted within the scope of his authority and was motivated 
either in whole or in part to carry out the employer's purposes. 
Hodaes v. Gibson Products Co.
 r 811 P.2d 151 at 157 (Utah 1991). 
Zumwalt was clearly acting within the scope of his authority 
when he fired Robertson, thus his tortious intent will be imputed 
to Utah Fuel Company as a matter of law. Therefore, the workers 
compensation bar does not apply. (See also, Retherford v. AT&T 
Communications, 844 P.2d 949 at fn. 8 (Utah 1992)) 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of employment at-will creates a mere rebuttable 
presumption that the employment relationship can be terminated at 
the will of the employer. This presumption can be overcome by 
proof of the existence of an implied-in-fact employment contract. 
The existence of an implied-in-fact employment contract is a fact 
issue. 
Plaintiff Robertson has established competent evidence that 
an implied-in-fact employment contract existed between him and Utah 
Fuel Company. That contract provided that Robertson would not be 
sanctioned for voluntarily coming forward to seek substance abuse 
treatment. The contract further reguired that Robertson would not 
be demoted or fired, except for violation of certain specified acts 
establishing good cause. Moreover, sanctions would not be imposed 
without first providing Robertson with progressive discipline. 
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Robertson was fired after voluntarily coming forward to 
obtain treatment in reliance on Utah Fuel's promise. He was fired 
for having done so. He was fired without having first been 
provided with progressive discipline in further violation of the 
parties7 implied-in-fact contract. 
Utah Fuel attempts to shirk its contractual obligations by 
asserting that it had disclaimed all such responsibilities. Utah 
Fuel thus seeks to reserve to itself the right to depart from and 
treat as illusory all of its promises. This it cannot do. The 
courts have stated that disclaimers cannot serve as an eternal 
escape hatch for an employer to make whatever unenforceable 
promises it is to its benefit to make. 
Defendant Utah Fuel Company is not entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. This Court should therefore reverse the lower 
court's ruling and allow this matter to be decided by the jury. 
DATED this /( day of May, 1994. 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ' ^  day of May, 1994, that two 
true and correct copies of the Appellant's Reply Brief were mailed, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jathan Janove, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
175 South Main Street 
Suite 1350 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
^/3C/Q 
12 
